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1. Introduction
Like the 1929 crisis, the current financial crisis
will be remembered as one of the most serious
in the history of world capitalism. Michel Cam-
dessus has described it as the first global crisis
of the 21st century, beginning in Mexico in
1994–1995 and continuing until 1997 or there-
abouts with the Asian crisis. The Mexican and
Asian financial crises coincide with deregulation
and liberalization processes
which in some cases had
already started a decade or
two before. These pro-
cesses have been accom-
panied by changes in pro-
duction structures and inter-
national trade, which are
revealing limits to what can
be done.
The increasing dif-
ficulty experienced by the
financial authorities of the
major economies and by
international financial bod-
ies in limiting the most
devastating effects of
events on the world economy makes it difficult,
in turn, to handle banking and financial crises.
The current institutional composition of the
markets, the deregulated nature of those markets
and the vast liquid assets in private hands have
even placed limits on concerted action by
national governments. At the same time, the
increasing number of national financial crises
has put an end to the stabilization model pro-
moted by the International Monetary Fund and
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the economic policies of nation states them-
selves.
This paper analyses the chief transform-
ations in the financial markets over the past
25 years. These changes are typical of a finan-
cial-globalization process and are factors in the
current financial instability and fragility. Finan-
cial deregulation has made it gradually impos-
sible for nation-states to control their money
supply or credit, forcing them to shoulder enor-
mous losses in the form of
public debt. At the same
time they do not appear to
be taking steps to acquire
the instruments needed to
limit the more destructive
effects of instability in the
monetary, exchange and
credit fields. Financial glo-
balization has not become
a regulatory process, nor
has it acquired the insti-
tutional form at the national
and international levels
which would bring about
financial stability.
One of the character-
istic features of the financial-deregulation process
has been the occurrence of banking crises. These
arise when the active management of balances
comes up against currency mismatch problems;
when credit is concentrated in certain sectors (for
example, oil or real estate) or companies; when
real interest rates are high during periods of
lower economic growth; when leverage levels
are high as a result of rapid privatizations or
takeovers; or when these factors are combined.
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The question of banking crises will therefore be
examined in the second part of this paper.
The third part of the paper surveys the new
level of concentration prevailing on financial
markets, the aim being to show how sources of
national and international liquidity continue to
remain highly concentrated. The Asian financial
crisis has boosted concentration even further,
with the result that true multinational financial
mega-conglomerates have arisen, leading to
overall consolidation of the sector. The paper
concludes by stressing the importance of state
monetary and credit management as the way to
achieve a stable relationship between growth in
production capacity and interest rates*.
2. Changes in the financial
markets
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
international agreements, exchange and interest-
rate instability on the major financial markets
has led to genuine structural changes in those
markets, although there is still no sign of any
new financial structures capable of offering the
stable long-term financing essential for the
expansion of production capacities.
A recent IMF study (1998) distinguishes
between the various types of crisis. It stresses
that the banking crises of the past 10 years, the
Mexican and Asian crises included, are produc-
ing global effects and finds that they can be
attributed to financial deregulation and liberaliz-
ation processes and to the part played by flows
of international capital and by financial inno-
vation in the run-up to the new millennium.
Essential elements for embarking on a
phase of stable, long-term economic growth
accordingly appear to be the re-establishment
of exchange rules and the stabilization of inter-
est rates. The structural financial changes that
have occurred over the past 25 years include
the following:
(1) The time schedules for financial deposits
and instruments have shortened; this has
* Editor’s note: Throughout this article, the authors
are using the terms ‘billion’ and ‘trillion’ in their
American senses: a billion is a thousand million, i.e.
109, with nine zeros; a trillion is a thousand billion,
i.e. 1012, with twelve zeros.
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been accompanied by the development of
an active secondary market in securities,
leading to a blurring of the distinctions
between the various concepts of money sup-
ply. ‘In particular, “money” has been
becoming less distinguishable from the
other liabilities of financial intermediaries’
(OECD, 1995, p. 10);
(2) Bank funds have changed into liabilities
yielding a return and originating mainly in
the money markets; there has been a growth
in the securitization of credit, together with
an enormous increase in the off-balance-
sheet operations of banks, particularly
involving the use of derivatives and the
management of, and trade in, securities; all
this has changed the structure of bank
income from one of margins to one of com-
missions;
(3) The dividing lines, where these existed,
between deposit banks and investment
banks have gradually disappeared; at the
same time, activity on the money and capi-
tal markets has increased, while credit
activity has declined on the markets as a
whole; investment-fund activity has
increased, with financial assets being highly
concentrated in the hands of a few man-
agers who shift around large volumes of
assets in short periods of time, destabilizing
currencies and economies as powerful as
those of the United Kingdom in 1992 and
as small as those of Mexico, Thailand,
Indonesia and the Republic of Korea;
(4) The volume and size of financial trans-
actions have grown rapidly; the increasing
number of off-balance-sheet operations has
tightened the links between financial inter-
mediaries, a few of whom dominate the
markets, and a pronounced trend has arisen
towards the building up of true financial
mega-conglomerates; the leading ten United
States banks possess assets of more than
US $2.6 trillion (Giro´n, 1998);
(5) The problems of financial supervision have
grown increasingly complex; at the same
time, risk-level assessment and intervention
by the financial authorities are becoming
more difficult despite the assistance of the
Bank for International Settlements, the
International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank;
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(6) Government debt has become one of the
most important bases for the growth in fin-
ancial assets, while the interest rates offered
by these instruments are the chief means
used to pursue exchange-rate objectives; the
United States, in particular, has had to keep
interest rates for government instruments
substantially higher than Japan and Ger-
many in order to prevent a massive flight of
financial assets from its market and continue
financing its deficit positions;
(7) The growing inability of nation-states to
regulate the activity of the major financial
conglomerates in order to oversee the risk
levels of their various operations casts doubt
on the financial authorities’ ability to con-
trol a systemic financial crisis; this ability
has been steadily eroded by the growing
liquidity levels generated by the intermedi-
aries themselves.
Believing that all these changes in the fin-
ancial markets are irreversible is as unrealistic
as attempting to ignore the profound changes
that have occurred in the ownership of assets
and in monopolistic competition. In this context,
Franc¸ois Chesnais states: ‘Declaring that finan-
cial hypertrophy together with its retinue of ills
is “irreversible” is to fall into a highly suspect
form of historical determinism. To put it at
its strongest, it would be ascribing to social
processes – which are the products of human
activity – a status similar to that of the pro-
cesses of biological evolution. For some,
uttering the word “irreversibility”, often in the
same breath as “realism”, has always amounted
to adopting a position in support of the estab-
lished order . . .’ (Chesnais, 1996, p. 30).
As the history of finance has shown on
other occasions, it is possible to return to con-
trolled financial systems in which the state takes
back its capacity to regulate and supervise fin-
ancial markets and intermediaries, even though
the latter and the growing fragility of the former
are still part of the processes involved in the
failure of the terms of surplus and wealth distri-
bution and the new economic division of the
world is still an ongoing process.
Since the breakdown of Bretton Woods and
the disappearance of fixed exchange rates and
of the dollar–gold exchange standard, neither
national governments nor international financial
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bodies see any solution to the problems encoun-
tered by both developed and developing coun-
tries in finding a path to growth which will
eliminate the continual financial, stock-market
and banking crises into which more and more
countries are falling every day.
There is a pressing need for financial mar-
kets to be given a new institutional and regulat-
ory framework capable of restraining financial
instability and of limiting the damage to pro-
duction capacity, growth and job creation. The
paradoxical world we live in compels us to seek
answers. How often have we asked ourselves,
Why so much stress on the inadequacy of sav-
ings when the volume of capital on the financial
markets increases two or three times more than
production every year? Why is the number of
poor people in the world increasing, just when
we have attained immense mastery over science
and technology applied to economic activity?
Why are there high rates of unemployment
accompanied by growing and unsatisfied needs
for food, education and health?
Why is the trend towards globalization run-
ning parallel with the increasing exclusion of
most of the population from education, health
services and electricity? Globalization and
exclusion do not constitute a promising combi-
nation. Progress along the road to globalization
has shown us that we live in one world and
share the same living environment and financial
crises, together with their economic and social
effects.
At this end of a century and of a millen-
nium, the opportunity arises, in many fields of
knowledge and of living together around the
world, to evaluate successes and set fresh goals
which will offer new routes and solutions. It is
also an opportunity to take up afresh the dis-
cussion on economic development and what it
is exactly and, in particular, on the relevance
and content of development policy.
The natural and evolutionist idea of the
economic process fell by the wayside when it
was challenged by the crisis of the 1920s and
1930s; it is further undermined by the current
international crisis. ‘Development does not con-
tain the concept of naturalness and spontaneity
involved in the evolutionist view, nor the con-
cept of gradual and continuous change. On the
contrary, development entails sweeping and
deliberate transformations, structural and
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institutional changes . . .’ (Sunkel and Paz,
1970, p. 24).
3. Banking crises and
financial globalization
As mentioned in the introduction, banking crises
have multiplied in the last 15 years, going hand
in hand with the process of international finan-
cial deregulation both in the developed and in
the developing and transitional countries. Crises
occur when the active management of balances
comes up against currency mismatch problems;
when credit is concentrated in certain sectors
(for example, oil or real estate) or companies;
when interest rates are high during periods of
lower economic growth; when there are high
leverage levels resulting from rapid privatiza-
tions or takeovers; or where there is a combi-
nation of these factors.
Recent banking crises are the outcome of
the deregulation and liberalization of national
financial systems and of increased competition
in the financial sector. They may be preceded
by monetary crises, external-debt crises, stock-
exchange crises or sectoral crises. Perhaps the
most notable crises of the last few years have
been the bank failures in Thailand, Indonesia,
the Republic of Korea and Japan, as well as
those in Scandinavia at the beginning of the
1990s and in Latin America since the middle
of the decade: for example, Mexico, Argentina,
Brazil and Venezuela. We should not forget the
failure of the savings and loan associations in
the United States during the 1980s which cost
the Federal Reserve 500 billion dollars, nor the
banking crises in Spain, the United Kingdom
and Chile during the same period.
Competition between the banks and other
financial intermediaries, the reduced importance
of the role traditionally played by the commer-
cial banks, the increased number of off-balance-
sheet operations and the participation of new
financial instruments are leading to rapid trans-
formation and sectoral conglomeration.
Many of the recent banking crises stem
largely from greater competition in markets
which have become increasingly integrated at
world level, and from the participation of non-
banking intermediaries. In the case of
developing countries and transitional economies,
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however, a comparative disadvantage arises
inasmuch as their sources of liquidity are asso-
ciated with relatively weak monetary standards.
The differentials maintained in interest
rates in order to achieve a degree of currency
stability tend to increase the foreign-exchange
component of bank liabilities, and even the liab-
ilities of non-bank enterprises. Abandoning the
local market, an influx of short-term capital
attracted by interest-rate differentials and rela-
tive currency stability quickly produces a mon-
etary imbalance in the banks and an inability
to pay on the part of non-banking corporations.
To the foregoing should be added the
search for instruments yielding a better return
on expanding money and capital markets and
the downward trend of investment and growth
rates in the world environment.
The new competition at world level which
accompanies financial deregulation has turned
debtor countries’ traditional financing and refi-
nancing methods towards credit securitization.
At the same time the stock-exchange listing and
privatization of firms has provided profitable
openings for the expansion of non-banking fin-
ancial services. Thus the inflow of early-matur-
ing capital into emerging markets underwent
extraordinary growth from the end of the 1980s
to the mid-1990s. Net capital flows to
developing countries, countries in transition and
recently industrialized economies represented
US$767 billion during the period 1994–1997;
developing countries, US$655.3 billion; Latin
America, US$164.7 billion; and Asia, US$295.6
billion. However, for this year Asia alone will
receive US$1.5 billion, while Latin America
will get US$71.7 billion. Although flows of
capital into open economies are a source of
financing, they are also a factor in the new
forms assumed by financial crises, particularly,
at the moment, the Asian crisis. If the adjust-
ment programmes improve the macro-economic
variables of the Republic of Korea, the Philip-
pines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, these
countries will experience a situation of surplus
and their economies will start growing again in
two years, but this ignores the social cost
implicit in these economic-policy measures as
well as the social implications, the most notable
example covered by this remark being Indonesia.
These markets established themselves as
sources of investment yielding attractive returns
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and exploited the liquidity and opportunities for
arbitrage and diversification offered by the
portfolios of institutional investors, pension and
mutual funds, insurance companies, brokerage
houses and investment banks. The annual aver-
age of net private-capital flows during the
1990–1996 period was US$148.1 billion, of
which US$131.2 billion was accounted for by
the developing countries. Altogether, these
countries received US$655.3 billion between
1994 and 1997. The Asia region received
approximately 45.1 per cent and the Latin
America region 38.9 per cent. The strength or
weakness of a banking system is the result of
macro-economic and structural policies which
allow, or do not allow, a close correlation
between the financial sector and the production
system. In Latin America the processes of trade
and finance liberalization have not been success-
ful, precisely because they have not helped to
raise investment and growth rates but instead
have increased financing costs and brought
about banking and financial crises. Examples of
this are Chile in the early 1980s and Brazil,
Venezuela, Mexico and Argentina in more
recent years.
It is consequently recognized in Latin
America that banking systems are vulnerable to
macro-economic changes, regardless of whether
they are properly regulated and supervised.
They are thus sensitive to changes in demand
for national currency or in external-capital
flows, which are capable of undermining the
ability of national banks to meet their commit-
ments.
The fiscal cost of restructuring or bailing
out banks has been very high in relation to
GDP; in the Republic of Korea alone it rep-
resents 33 per cent, in Japan 31 per cent and
in Mexico between 12 and 15 per cent of GDP.
However, the costs of a banking crisis are
larger: in addition to the fiscal cost of restructur-
ing the financial sector, there is the effect of
this process on the level of economic activity,
as well as the inability of the financial markets
to function efficiently for a long period. To
summarize, several elements must be considered:
(1) Since the drop in international loans during
the 1980s’ ‘debt crisis’, the financial mar-
kets have reactivated their expansion
towards the emerging economies through
stock-exchange instruments and securities
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involving greater liquidity and risk. The
general use of securitization gives even
direct investment greater liquidity by largely
blurring the distinction between it and port-
folio investments in terms of their impact
on external accounts (Kregel, 1998).
(2) Financial deregulation and liberalization in
the various national financial systems
started as a consequence of the need to
increase the intermediation margins and the
commissions of national banks, and the sec-
uritization of credit has produced an expan-
sion both in off-balance-sheet activities and
in non-banking financial intermediaries.
(3) At world level, a number of countries are
increasing the participation of capital flows
by portfolio investment abroad; this increase
and the yields from these flows greatly
exceed the countries’ economic growth. An
asymmetry is thus generated between econ-
omic growth rate and the rate of return on
financial investments.
(4) Financial integration and globalization in
the direction of a single, homogeneous and
permanent market operating 24 hours a day
stems from the technological revolution in
communications, but started with the failure
of Bretton Woods. The renewed pre-emi-
nence of the dollar on the international
economy as the result of a significant inter-
est rate differential has not greatly affected
its dynamism, which is due to the deregu-
lation of the domestic financial market and
to the extensive development of financial
innovation (Correa, 1998).
Management and settlement of the banking
crises both in the Asian and in the Latin Amer-
ican countries have scarcely begun. The various
measures taken by governments are aimed, in
accordance with IMF guidelines, at declaring
bankrupt and winding up certain banks ident-
ified as insolvent, at guaranteeing deposits (so
far to an unlimited extent) and at transferring
redemption costs to public funds.
All this goes together with reform of the
supervisory institutions and of the legal and
juridical framework so as to open the way for
efficient bankruptcy control and to reduce
deposit-insurance coverage. The participation of
nation states in the ownership of banking inter-
mediaries is intended in any case to be tempor-
ary (bridging banks), thus permitting the speedy
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repurchase of already restructured banks by sol-
vent banks, chiefly foreign. Progress is likewise
being made towards setting up receivership
firms along the lines of the winding up of sav-
ings and loan associations in the United States,
which will enable rapid change to take place
in the ownership of firms facing insolvency.
History shows that banking crises are very
slow to be resolved. The economic capacity to
cope with a volume of liquid assets in the form
of deposits tied to loans to insolvent economic
operators takes a long time to acquire and may
entail sweeping structural adjustments. In any
case, monetary austerity makes it more difficult
to deal with these banking crises and causes
borrowers and the banks themselves to become
insolvent. The tax burden entailed in redemp-
tions ties up a growing and substantial part of
public budgets already depleted by recession. A
progressive solution leading to rapid economic
growth with employment requires the involve-
ment of a wide range of political forces commit-
ted to development.
4. Concentration in the
financial markets
Taking account both of the greater presence of
non-banking financial intermediaries and of the
national origin of intermediaries, the relative
share of financial intermediaries on the various
markets has also changed in recent years. As
regards the banks, in the 1980s Japan enjoyed
the highest rate of growth of external and dom-
estic banking assets, to the point where Japanese
banks displaced the major United States banks
from their leading positions.
The banking system in many countries is
dominated by a few large banks. The share of
the five largest banks in total bank assets is
around 40 per cent in Argentina, 50 per cent
in India, 60 per cent in Thailand and Mexico,
13 per cent in the United States, 27 per cent
in Japan, 17 per cent in Germany, 47 per cent
in France, 29 per cent in Italy, 57 per cent in
the United Kingdom, 65 per cent in Canada,
50 per cent in Switzerland and 49 per cent in
Spain. In most of these countries the concen-
tration is higher than in 1980. Why do financial
deregulation and the new competitive frame-
work resulting therefrom promote the conglom-
eration of financial services?
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Examples of this are: the tie-up between
Chase Manhattan and Chemical Bank and a
series of bank mergers in the United States; the
union between Bank of Tokyo and Mitsubishi
Bank; and the recent partnership between
Citycorp and Travelers.
These mergers represent a new stage of
bank integration in the United States and world-
wide. They are directed specifically at the fields
in which the new financial power structure of
global intermediaries must be set up, in addition
to the new financial market, service and inter-
mediation structure which is emerging from the
financial crisis in Latin America and Asia.
In 1995–1996, the Japanese banks
accounted for seven out of ten of the world’s
leading banks from the viewpoint of the size
of their assets (excluding off-balance-sheet
operations). The five leading Japanese banks
reported assets exceeding US$2.4 trillion; these
five banks alone thus accounted for around 8.5
per cent of world banking assets. This enormous
expansion in Japanese banking also reflected the
rising value of the yen against the dollar during
the 1980s and its enhanced presence on the
international markets. However, because of the
dollar’s revival and the deep Japanese financial
crisis in the late 1990s, Japanese intermediaries
have had to restructure their operations on both
the domestic and the international markets.
The appearance of mega-consortia follow-
ing the financial mergers of the first few months
of 1998 is altering this picture at an ever-acce-
lerating pace, with a trend towards the repo-
sitioning of United States financial intermedi-
aries in the markets, including in South East
Asia.
The leading five German banks reported
assets in excess of US$1.6 trillion in 1995–
1996, representing around 5.7 per cent of world
banking assets, while the five largest United
States banks handle more than US$1 trillion,
i.e. 3.6 per cent of world banking assets.1 How-
ever, the recent merger of Citycorp with Trav-
elers will alone result in a consortium with
assets exceeding US$740 billion.
The decline in the relative position of the
United States banks on the domestic and inter-
national markets during the 1980s and part of
the 1990s is being rapidly reversed. The current
mega-mergers, combined with their increasing
relative share in ‘emerging markets’, is leading
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Tension on the Sao Paulo stock exchange, 18 January 1999. Marie Hippenmeyer/AFP
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to a new positioning of these intermediaries in
a very short space of time.
The segmentation of financial intermedi-
aries in the United States in the 1930s boosted
the development of non-banking financial inter-
mediaries. United States bank assets in 1994
accounted for 23 per cent of that country’s total
financial assets, while in Japan and Germany
those assets accounted for 79 per cent and 77
per cent respectively (Bank for International
Settlements, 1996, p. 126).
The presence of the United States and the
dollar on the financial markets must therefore
be assessed in the light of other, non-banking
intermediaries. In about 1993, the share of
world assets held by United States investment
funds reached nearly 50 per cent. Counting both
bank and fund-managed assets, the United
States took up 21 per cent of the market in that
year, exceeded only by Japan with 24 per cent;
Germany held 4.3 per cent, while France and
the United Kingdom held 6.8 per cent and 3.6
per cent respectively (Barth et al., 1996).
The considerable development of invest-
ment funds, especially in the United States, has
been buoyed up mainly by credit securitization
and the incorporation into the capital market of
local and foreign companies, the latter as the
result of a number of deregulations. United
States banks themselves are sharing in the
expansion of investment funds by diversifying
their activities and establishing true financial
conglomerates; all this is made possible by spe-
cific deregulations such as the authorization of
subsidiaries of bank holding companies, the cre-
ation of Section 20 subsidiaries beginning in
April 1987 and the gradual repeal of the
McFadden Law.
It has not been possible to moderate, as in
previous years, the imminent new international
financial crisis resulting from the insolvency of
banks and companies in developed countries
like Japan and the Republic of Korea, in
developing countries like Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, South Africa, etc., or in transitional
countries like Russia, by means of government
intervention, for example by the participation,
whether concerted or not, of the central banks
in the foreign-exchange markets, or the use of
state resources to limit stock-market falls.
The main factor preventing the outbreak of
a larger-scale crisis was the extraordinary
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growth in international liquidity brought about
by the development and penetration of deriva-
tives. However, during these months, and with
the worsening of the crisis in August 1998, the
presence of that liquidity has been weakening
the markets even further and the financial auth-
orities show a definite inability to curb it.
The derivatives market resumed its head-
long development in the last years of the 1980s.
It is estimated that by 1996 an underlying
amount of principal representing US$55.7 tril-
lion had accumulated (United States General
Accounting Office, 1996a). Its explosive growth
has been a factor in the rise in stock markets
world-wide and in 1995–1996 was accompanied
by an extraordinary increase in international
bank lending. Over half of all transactions on
the organized market take place in the United
States, 17 per cent in Japan and 21 per cent
in Europe.
The leading banks and exchanges in the
United States, Japan, France, the United King-
dom, Germany and Switzerland are the domi-
nant players on the derivatives markets and the
medium and small intermediaries tend to be the
final users.2
There is a high degree of concentration.
Fifteen members of the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association accounted for 93.6 per
cent of the derivatives activities of the commer-
cial banks. Of these 15, six (Banker Trust, Bank
of America, Chase, Chemical, Citycorp and
Morgan) are described as ‘ruling world deriva-
tives’ because they account for 89.5 per cent
of the derivatives held by the 15 (Sinkey, Hiles
and Carter, 1995, p. 2).
The world derivatives market is essentially
controlled by a few intermediaries. There exists
‘. . . a high concentration in derivative activities.
Not more than 50 world institutions currently
dominate the market, with the bulk of activity
being carried out by a much smaller number’
(Witschi and Holzer, 1995, p. 5).
The changes in the United States financial
market have also led to a strong movement
towards the concentration of credit and private
liquidity. In 1984, the ten major bank holding
companies (BHC) controlled 17.4 per cent of
bank deposits; by 1994 this figure had become
25.6 per cent (United States General Accounting
Office, 1996b, p. 23). According to statistics
published by The Banker magazine, the 11
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major banks held 30 per cent of total assets in
1995. The number of banking institutions fell
from nearly 36 000 in 1980 to almost 24 000
in 1995 (not counting credit unions), while the
ten largest increased their level of concentration
from 14 per cent to 21 per cent of total assets.
Mergers and takeovers in the sector have been
increasing, their value in 1989–1990 being
US$37.8 billion, rising to US$82.5 billion in
1995–1996. Despite the renewed dynamism of
mergers and takeovers in the 1990s, the process
of consolidation in the sector will continue for
several more years (Bank for International
Settlements, 1996).
As regards institutional investors, these
include mutual funds as well as private pension
funds and insurance companies. The United
States holds nearly 50 per cent of the total
world assets managed by those funds, followed
by France with 12 per cent and Japan with
11 per cent, while Luxembourg and Germany
together account for another 11 per cent (Barth
et al., 1996).
In the United States alone, it is estimated
that in 1993 these investors managed assets
worth more than US$8 trillion, i.e. around 125
per cent of the product, and that by 1996 this
figure could exceed US$13 trillion, i.e. 180 per
cent of the product (Farnetti, 1996, p. 192).
One of the most important fund-controlling
firms is Fidelity Investment, which at the begin-
ning of 1996 was managing assets worth around
US$416 billion. The mutual funds alone – some
5600 of them – are estimated to have been
managing assets worth US$2.5 trillion at the
beginning of 1995. This figure may reach US$3
trillion in 1998.
Institutional investors, particularly those of
the United States, have played a prominent role
in the flow of capital into and out of the finan-
cial markets of countries with ‘emerging mar-
kets’. In the case of Mexico, the principal inves-
tors have been: Fidelity, Scudder, Merril Lynch,
Oppenheimer, Putman Funds Management,
March and McLennan Co., Soros Fund Manage-
ment, Salomon Bros. Inc., Nomura Securities
Co. and Weston Bank; there have also been
other investments managed by banks such as
J. P. Morgan, CS First Boston and Citycorp
(Correa, 1997).
United States commercial banks operating
as BHCs have been expanding their investment-
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banking operations through Section 20 branches.
The financial authorities again expanded their
capacity to engage in securities-trading activities
at the beginning of 1997.
Penetration of Latin America by foreign
banks has been startling. Citibank, for example,
has assets worth US$28 billion in 26 countries,
while the Bank of Boston has assets of US$14
billion in six countries. Banco Santander brings
together banks included among the ten leading
banks of countries such as Argentina, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. The Bank of
Nova Scotia has the controlling option on two
of the largest banks in Argentina and Mexico,
and also has holdings in Chile, Peru and Vene-
zuela and in two banks in Central America. The
BCH and its strategic partner, Banco Comercial
Portugue´s, have a commercial bank in Mexico.
Citibank recently initiated a strategy of bank
acquisitions in Latin America. Similarly, the
Bank of Boston recently announced its acqui-
sition of Deutsche Bank of Argentina, an oper-
ation likely to make it the second largest bank
in the country and equip it to deal more
efficiently with future inflows of foreign capital.
Keen competition between financial inter-
mediaries with regard to the formation of high-
yield assets in the most varied currency denomi-
nations is increasing concentration and cen-
tralization in the form of large financial con-
glomerates, although this does not necessarily
mean an improved competitive position. The
prices of bank shares, for example, in countries
like the United States, Germany, Italy, Finland,
Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland
and Sweden, are below 1980 levels. Earnings
as a percentage of assets have fallen from their
1980 levels in countries like Japan, France, the
United Kingdom, Finland, Norway and Spain.
At the same time, income other than interest
charges for credit has risen substantially since
1980 for banks belonging to countries such as
the United States, France, the United Kingdom,
Canada, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway,
Sweden and Spain, as a result of which credit
proper is being replaced in banking operations
by trade in securities.
All this has not necessarily led to greater
efficiency as regards the availability of
adequate, stable and low-cost resources for
investment. Real interest rates have tended to
rise substantially in the major economies during
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the 1990s and, since the 1980s, have stayed
well above the economic growth rate in the
group of most highly developed economies. The
high real rates of interest resulting from increas-
ing financial fragility and instability – together
with surcharges for the various risks (exchange,
systemic, moral, etc.) – are becoming incompat-
ible with increased productivity and with the
payment capacity of many firms, particularly
those operating on the markets of countries with
weak currencies.
The increasing participation of foreign fin-
ancial intermediaries in developing countries
does not necessarily lead to a greater avail-
ability of resources for productive local financ-
ing which will be both stable and cheap,
because their activities do not in themselves
reduce exchange-risk surcharges or ensure a
drop in bank margins. In Mexico, for example,
their operations are focused on corporate ser-
vices, particularly consumer credit and invest-
ment funds. Their profitability will depend both
on expansion of their share of the corporate
market and on the share they have of the
exchange and money markets. They are appear-
ing on the scene in increasing numbers, parti-
cularly as providers of foreign-currency funds
to local banks, thus establishing themselves as
a determining factor in the cost of financing in
both national and foreign currency. National
banks are thus not only yielding ground on the
local market but also losing the power to
impose their own asset and liability manage-
ment strategy on that market.
The risk of losing national control over the
payment system thus arises from two factors:
first, the inability of the local bank to restore
the payment capacity of insolvent bank bor-
rowers and, second, the increase in the number
of foreign financial intermediaries, who gradu-
ally impose their own margin and cost structure
on the operation of the banking system as a
whole.
5. State and market: stable
development financing
In the context of freedom of capital movement,
the heavy concentration of sources of national
and international liquidity in the hands of private
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operators has not led to a sustained long-term
recovery of development financing. On the con-
trary, it generates a new level of competition
leading to the denationalization of development-
financing systems and strengthens the conditions
favouring the transfer of local savings towards
the return to be obtained from typically very
short-dated capital with a high expected yield.
At the same time, it does nothing to solve,
especially in the short and medium terms, the
problems of financial fragility occasioned by
the enormous differential between the returns
required on such capital and increases in local
productivity and profitability. This phenomenon
manifests itself with ever greater force in con-
tinual bankruptcies and liquidations of local and
national intermediaries, even where these had
resisted the first onslaught of the banking crisis.
Again, the logic of this international
mobility of capital accompanied by high finan-
cial concentration necessarily results in a change
in the ownership of the assets, and even the
fiscal resources, of nation-states. This, however,
is not reflected in a flow of stable low-cost
financing that increases local production
capacities and employment.
Once penetration by highly concentrated
foreign financial intermediation is well under
way and the processes of privatizing leading
local companies and integrating them into the
financial market have been carried out, with the
local markets being divided among the major
international corporations, it will undoubtedly
be possible to manage the problem of exchange-
rate stability through monetary-integration pro-
cesses. However, the resulting financial fragility
and instability impose a high cost in the form
of the destruction of production capacities and
employment, with no hope of recovery in the
short and medium terms.
Financial opening up and liberalization in
economies such as those known as ‘emerging
markets’, in the economies of countries in tran-
sition, or even in developed economies like the
Japanese, jeopardize monetary sovereignty (De
Brunhoff, 1996; Kregel, 1996).
The recent international financial crisis
highlights the inability of local financial auth-
orities to cope with it and the need to have
recourse to the United States Federal Reserve
and the International Monetary Fund as lenders
of last resort.
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Once the coherence of areas of national
production has been broken, financing terms
remain subject to the movements of the inter-
national financial markets and particularly to the
US dollar; references to earnings and prices are
likewise dollar-denominated. However, a size-
able volume of transactions and productive
assets, including wages, continues to be con-
trolled and is dealt with in terms of local cur-
rencies, which leads to a deflationary process
accompanied by over-indebtedness and
exchange-rate deterioration.
All this indicates that during the integration
process those areas which have been liberalized
in this way will, if the present course is main-
tained, culminate in more thorough monetary
integration, provided only that certain sectors
crucial to the transnational expansion of the
corporations, particularly those corporations tied
to the US dollar, become part of their assets
(Correa, 1998).
The transfer of a substantial part of fiscal
resources to the sphere of financial-income dis-
tribution, together with the rise in privatizations,
takeovers and mergers, is currently a matter of
interest to the financial mega-conglomerates. To
a large extent, if such a strategy is to do well,
it will be essential to make changes in local
legal systems and to bring about greater deregu-
lation in financial markets, including the United
States market. Consequently, the immediate
path to be followed by the financial-globaliz-
ation process, which includes monetary inte-
gration, is strongly determined by the particular
form in which some of the main disputes are
settled in the political field. In the case of the
relationship between Japan and the United
States, such disputes concern the progress of
liberalization, financial opening up and reforms
in financial legislation.
The financial opening up and deregulation
now in progress mean, for many countries, not
only surrendering their sovereignty and ceasing
to control monetary policy but also, and
especially, losing the capacity to utilize sur-
pluses, mobilize their resources and expand cre-
dit for the process of accumulation. An econ-
omic and political problem therefore arises
when the financing of accumulation is carried
out from another political area.
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The opening up and liberalization of fin-
ancial markets have represented the key point
at which a particular form of competition and
distribution of surplus is broken. Local price,
productivity and profitability structures are reor-
ganized, and this gives rise to a process of
international conglomeration in many productive
sectors such as telephony and telecommuni-
cations, the car industry, electronics, energy and
oil, etc. Such conglomeration is increasingly
incompatible with the institutional structures of
political and social management in nation states
in that it fails to address the democratic expec-
tations of populations, which are insisting more
and more on taking a hand in building their
own future.
It is therefore important on economic,
political and social grounds to construct new
terms of development co-operation in which co-
operation with a view to financial stability is
a priority.
6. Conclusions
The Asian crisis and the international reper-
cussions of the stock-exchange falls in October
1997 and April and August 1998 signal the
beginnings of an economic crisis like that of
the 1930s which calls into question hegemonic
economic policy, flows of international capital,
financial bodies themselves and the international
monetary system. The recent slowdown in the
economies of China and the United States dur-
ing the second quarter of 1998, recessionary
expectations in Japan, the consequences of the
banking crises and the insolvency of numerous
debtor governments and companies jeopardize
the viability of the policies orchestrated up to
now and place the need for a sweeping reform
of international financial relations on the
agenda. The lack of prudential regulation, and
the integration of production at global level
under the control of transnational conglomer-
ates, leaves nation-states in a situation of down-
right weakness when it comes to achieving
stable economic development which will ensure
sustained growth, better income distribution and
higher employment.
Translated from Spanish
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Notes
1. It should be pointed out that
these statistics are based only on
banking assets and take no account
of off-balance-sheet transactions,
which have increased significantly
throughout the banking world, but
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